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Abstract—Recently, a number of deep learning-based anomaly
detection algorithms were proposed to detect attacks in dynamic
industrial control systems. The detectors operate on measured
sensor data, leveraging physical process models learned a priori.
Evading detection by such systems is challenging, as an attacker
needs to manipulate a constrained number of sensor readings in
real-time with realistic perturbations according to the current
state of the system. In this work, we propose a number of
evasion attacks (with different assumptions on the attacker’s
knowledge), and compare the attacks’ cost and efficiency against
replay attacks. In particular, we show that a replay attack on
a subset of sensor values can be detected easily as it violates
physical constraints. In contrast, our proposed attacks leverage
manipulated sensor readings that observe learned physical con-
straints of the system. Our proposed white box attacker uses an
optimization approach with a detection oracle, while our black
box attacker uses an autoencoder (or a convolutional neural
network) to translate anomalous data into normal data. Our
proposed approaches are implemented and evaluated on two
different datasets pertaining to the domain of water distribution
networks. We then demonstrated the efficacy of the real-time
attack on a realistic testbed. Results show that the accuracy of the
detection algorithms can be significantly reduced through real-
time adversarial actions: for the BATADAL dataset, the attacker
can reduce the detection accuracy from 0.6 to 0.14. In addition,
we discuss and implement an Availability attack, in which the
attacker introduces detection events with minimal changes of the
reported data, in order to reduce confidence in the detector.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computational and physical infrastructures are nowadays
interconnected. Computers, communication networks, sensors
and actuators allow to control physical processes. Data are
retrieved from the sensors and communicated to computers,
where they are analyzed, and decisions are made. Finally,
these decisions are sent from computers back to the physical
infrastructures as commands to actuators. Such systems are
commonly referred to as cyber-physical systems (CPS). Ex-
amples of such systems are industrial control systems (ICS),
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autonomous vehicles, smart grids and, more in general, all
systems falling under the umbrella definition of “Internet of
Things” [1]. Since these systems operate in the physical world,
they should guarantee security, safety and reliability in order
to succeed in their tasks without harming the environment in
which they operate. Moreover, CPS can have a strategic role,
such as controlling interconnected critical infrastructures like
power grids [2] and water supply systems [3].
The integration of modern security features into existing ICS
is challenging, as industrial devices are resource constrained,
and protocols need to be legacy compliant (i.e., they have to be
backward compatible to decades old devices in the field, which
do not support authentication or encryption). For that reason,
complementary security solutions such as passive process
data monitoring are promising. In recent years, a number
of authors have proposed such solutions, and implemented
anomaly detection approaches based on a broad range of
techniques, including control theory [4] and Machine Learning
(ML) [5]–[11]. In general, the goal of such systems is to
leverage reported sensor data in order to detect attacks and
anomalies that affect actuators.
Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) plays and important
role to explore the robustness of machine-learning based
anomaly detectors against manipulations. So far, the potential
of AML has been explored in a few areas of computer
science—e.g., image or speech recognition—, but little is
known about the potential of AML approaches to evade attack
detection in ICS. Evasion attacks in our context are challeng-
ing as they need to manipulate (in real-time) reported data
from one or multiple sensors to induce a wrong classification
of the system’s state, while matching physical laws imposed
by the system. While in other contexts, universal adversarial
perturbations [12], [13] are used to perform real-time manip-
ulations (using precomputed patterns), manipulations in ICS
cannot be precomputed as they need to be consistent with
the current dynamic conditions of the system (with a large
potential state space). In particular, successful application of
AML algorithms in the ICS domain must account for two
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2key features characterizing process-based anomaly detectors.
First, process-based anomaly detectors typically account for
the spatial and temporal correlation characterizing the un-
derlying physical processes [14]. Second, detectors in the
ICS domain are trained to detect not only outliers, but also
contextual anomalies (i.e., observations classified as abnormal
only when viewed against other variables that characterize the
behavior of the physical process [15]). In contrast to related
work that assumes unlimited computational power to compute
pertubations [16], AML algorithms for ICS will also need
to produce adversarial examples in real-time1, to react to the
dynamic system.
In this work, we propose and evaluate attacks on process-
based anomaly detectors for simulated and real world ICS, and
propose two techniques to craft adversarial examples2 in real-
time. In particular, the classifier under attack is the anomaly
detection system, while the samples are the sensor readings
that the classifier uses to decide if the system is ‘safe’ or ‘under
attack’. The attacker’s goal is to change the classification
outcome by manipulating a subset of sensor readings, in
order to hide an ongoing manipulation over the physical
process (called Integrity attack in [17], described as ‘Integrity
attacks result in intrusion points being classified as normal’).
We explore attacks on such detectors in two settings with
different information available to the attacker, and compare
them against replay attacks on a subset of sensors. Our results
show that a) constrained replay attacks are easily detected
as they violate physical correlations, b) using our white box
model a powerful attacker can leverage knowledge on the
system to perform efficient (but computationally expensive)
attacks, and c) using our proposed black box attacks it is
possible to craft effective adversarial samples in real-time.
In addition, we explore Availability attacks [17] (‘availabil-
ity attacks cause so many classification errors, both false neg-
atives and false positives, that the system becomes effectively
unusable’), in which the attacker looks for small perturba-
tions to legitimate features that will—seemingly incorrectly—
trigger ML-based attack detection schemes. This is useful to
force the defender to increase detection thresholds (reducing
its detection rate), or to eventually ignore alarms.
We summarize our main contributions as follows:
• We propose and design evasion attacks on ICS process-
based anomaly detectors that produce example which do
not violate physical constraints, leveraging the knowledge
of the Anomaly Detection System (white box).
• We propose and design a system to hide attacks from
an unknown Deep Learning Anomaly Detection System
(black box) using adversarially trained autoencoders, en-
abling dynamic attacks in real-time.
• We evaluate and discuss the proposed attacks, and com-
pare their performance against replay attacks. The evalu-
ation is conducted over a simulated ICS process dataset
and a real ICS process dataset, both containing data of
water distribution systems.
1With real-time, we mean examples are crafted wrt. the current dynamic
state of the system, in less time than the sampling rate.
2We differentiate between sample (original set of sensor readings), and
adversarial example (manipulated set of sensor readings).
• We practically implement and demonstrate the attacks in
real-word Industrial Control System testbed, and show
that they are possible in real-time.
• We also show that it is possible to use our framework
for Availability attacks, i.e., to produce false positives,
causing the detector to raise alarms without any actual
physical process manipulation.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. Back-
ground concepts are introduced in Section II. We present
the problem of adversarial learning attacks on ML-based
detectors in Section III. Our design of attacks is proposed
in Section IV, and their implementation and evaluation is
presented in Section V. We discuss our work and next steps in
Section VI, and summarize related work in Section VII. The
paper is concluded in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND ON EVASION ATTACKS
In this section, we provide a brief overview on Evasion
Attacks. A more complete review of related work is presented
in Section VII. In Adversarial learning, an evasion attack
is launched by an adversary to control the output behavior
of a machine learning model through crafted inputs, called
adversarial examples. Several evasion attack and defenses
mechanisms have been proposed in the context of image,
speech recognition and malware detection. The attacker scope
and constraints vary from context to context [18].
In the case of image recognition, the attacker’s goal could
be the misclassification of the sample, either on a random
target class or on a desired target class. In both cases, a
constraint over the sample is the human indistinguishability
of the sample, e.g., an attacker aiming to craft a dog sample
(to have it classified as a cat) should not change the human
perception of it. This is achieved by solving an optimization
problem that minimizes distance between the sample and
the adversarial example e.g. by minimizing norms: L0, L2,
L∞. The work by [19] is the first that specifically studies
adversarial manipulation to image classification using neural
networks. The authors found that only a small portion of the
image needs to be modified to achieve the attacker’s goal.
In the case of malware detection, the task is binary (malware
vs. benign software), so the attacker’s goal is the misclassifica-
tion of a malware sample. The constraint over the adversarial
example is to leave malware behavior unchanged, meaning that
the distortion introduced to the malware should not eliminate
its malicious properties. Works such as [20] craft highly
effective adversarial examples for neural networks used for
malware classification.
The authors of [18] characterize attacks on machine learning
models using a 4-tuple representation of the system under
attack. The tuple is characterized by the training dataset D,
the feature set X (e.g., the set of features used to train the
model), the learning algorithm f , and the trained parameters
w. In an adversarial setting, an attacker can have complete or
partial knowledge of each component of the system; limited
knowledge of a component is denoted with the symbols Dˆ, Xˆ ,
fˆ and wˆ respectively. In particular, the authors characterize
three types of attack scenario: Perfect-knowledge white box
3Fig. 1. High level system and attacker model. The PLCs locally control
the actuators based on their sensor readings, and report data to the SCADA,
which feeds the detector. The attacker can manipulate (1) the commands sent
to the actuator (out of scope of this work), and (2) the data provided to
the SCADA. The detector consists of a system model, which can provide
additional features, and a classifier.
attackers characterized by the tuple (D,X , f, w), Limited-
knowledge gray box attacks (Dˆ,X , f, wˆ) and Zero-knowledge
black box attacks (Dˆ, Xˆ , fˆ , wˆ). In Section III, we use that
notation to introduce our proposed solution and position it
within the related literature.
III. EVASION ATTACKS ON PROCESS-BASED ANOMALY
DETECTION
In this section, we introduce our system and attacker model,
and our general problem statement for concealment and Avail-
ability Attacks. Then, we present our abstract approach for the
white and black box attacker.
A. System Model
We consider a system under attack (Figure 1) consisting
of a number of sensors and actuators, connected to one
or more PLCs, which are in turn connected to a SCADA
system that gathers data from the PLCs. In our work, we
assume that the SCADA is passive, so it does not send
control commands to the PLCs (e.g., to actively probe for
manipulations). The SCADA feeds an attack detection system,
whose goal is to accurately identify the instances in which the
attacker manipulates the physical process, while minimizing
the number of false detections. The attack detection system
generally consists of two main components: a system model,
which is used to generate additional features, and a classifier,
which, for each time step, classifies the system as either under
attack or under normal operating conditions (see Section VII
for more details on prior work on classifiers in this context).
B. Attacker Model
Attacker Goal and Capabilities. In an ICS environment, an
attacker can perform an evasion attack to achieve one of the
two following goals.
A first goal (Integrity Attack) is to conceal ongoing manip-
ulations of the physical process, which requires changing the
commands sent to the actuators. We assume that the attacker
is already able to precisely control a subset of the actuators,
and that the attacker manipulates a subset of traffic signals
from the PLCs to SCADA (i.e., the sensor data) to conceal
this attack from the detector.
An alternative second goal is Availability attack: The at-
tacker aims to
introduce alarms into the detection system with minimal
changes in the reported sensor data (and no change in the
underlying process). When such alarms would be investigated,
the reported sensor data would be sufficiently close to the state
of the process, and thus the efficacy of the detection system
would be questioned, potentially allowing for future alarms to
be taken less seriously.
Attacker Knowledge. Using the notation introduced in Sec-
tion II, an evasion attack is characterized by the knowledge
of the attacker about the training dataset D, feature set X ,
learning algorithm f , and trained parameters w. In particular,
we classify attacks as white box, black box, and replay. For
all attacks, we assume that the attacker aims to manipulate
the subset of sensor readings that will change the detector’s
classification label, knowing them explicitly (white box) or not
(replay and black box).
The attacks are conducted in real time (i.e., per time
step), not a posteriori (i.e., applied retrospectively to a longer
sequence of sensor readings after they are fully received by
the attacker).
White Box attack. In a white box attack, the attacker knows
the exact system model and its variables (such as the currently
estimated system state), and the exact thresholds of the classi-
fication system. Thus, the white box attacker is characterized
by the tuple (D,X , f, w). With that information, the attacker
could either run basic exhaustive search, basic optimization
strategies, or more complex approaches (especially solutions
that use the gradient signal from the attacked model).
Black Box attack. In a black box attack, the attacker is aware
of the general detection scheme (e.g., type of system model),
but unaware of internal variables of the system model and
exact thresholds used in the classification. We note that our
black box attack is different from the one defined in [18],
(Dˆ, Xˆ , fˆ , wˆ), from a threefold perspective:
First, our attack does not require the knowledge of f or
its approximation fˆ . In the usual setting, even if the attack
does not require to build a surrogate model fˆ , the attacker
is assumed to be able to query the classifier under attack in
a black-box fashion. This allows him to get feedback on the
provided labels or confidence scores (this is done for example
in [21]–[24]).
However, in our case, the nature of the environment imposes
that the attacker cannot query the system even in a black-
box manner, as this would mean potentially raising the alarm.
Thus, we consider that the only assumption of the attacker
with respect to f is that Deep Learning techniques are used
for anomaly detection.
The second difference imposed by the ICS environment is
the knowledge of the feature set (sensor readings). In order to
detect anomalies using information coming from sensors, the
defender is likely to use all the information he has. Under this
assumption, the attacker crafts adversarial examples leveraging
the complete set of features that he intercepts between PLC
4and SCADA. Referring to X or Xˆ is the same, since the
attacker assumes that the best case for the defender is to use
all available features.
Finally, we assume that the attacker can collect an approx-
imation of the training dataset (i.e., network traffic captured
and decoded during the normal operation of the system). In
the ICS case, recording normal operations at different time
steps gives samples from the same dynamical physical process
(assuming overall periodic operations with multiple stages).
The more data the attacker collects, the better the training
dataset is approximated. In fact, collecting more data will bring
the attacker to see the realization of different stages of the ICS
(potentially all stages involved in the ICS normal operations).
In general, we can say that the attacker is able to collect Dˆ,
but, according to time spent collecting data, the attacker can
reach the complete knowledge of D. Thus, we can define our
black box attacker as (Dˆ,X , AAfˆ , @ˆw ), since the attacker does
not need the usage of these elements.
Replay Attacks. In this work, we use replay attacks (proposed
in related work [25]) as a baseline to compare to. In a
replay attack, the attacker records sensor readings for a certain
amount of time and repeats them afterwards, e.g., while
manipulating a physical process by sending an exogenous
control input [25]. By doing so, the attacker aims to avoid
detection by a monitoring system based on reported sensor
data. In this work, we assume that the attacker was able to
record selected data in the system over a certain length of
time (e.g. one day), and will then replay that data at the start
of the attack. In this kind of attacks there is no adversarial
learning involved. The resulting tuple of a replay attack is
(Dˆ,X , AAfˆ , @ˆw ), that corresponds to the one of black box attack.
C. Problem Statement
The goal of the attacker is to launch an evasion attack
on an ICS to hide the true state of the process from an
anomaly detector. In particular, we assume that the anomalous
physical process results in a feature vector ~x, which triggers
the detection system. The attacker thus needs to find an
alternative vector ~x′, which prevents detection of the attack.
Integrity Attack. We formalize the integrity attack as follows:
given a feature vector ~x and a classification function y() s.t. the
detector correctly classifies y(~x) = ‘under attack’, the attacker
is looking for a perturbation ~x + δ s.t. y(~x + δ) =‘safe’. We
assume two different settings for the attacker. Unconstrained
attack, that the attacker can manipulate all the n features in
~x, and her perturbations are limited in terms of L0 distance to
be at most n. Constrained attack we assume that the attacker
is constrained to perturb a subset of k out of n variables in
~x, and her perturbations are limited in terms of L0 distance to
not exceed distance k.
Availability Attack. We formalize the availability attack
problem as follows: given normal operations sensor readings
correctly classified as ‘safe’, the attacker aims to distort them
in order to cause false alarms by the detector. More formally,
given a feature vector ~x and classification function y() s.t.
the detector correctly classifies y(~x) = ‘safe’, the attacker is
Fig. 2. Simplified example of attack concealment. The plot shows the distance
(i.e., difference) between the sensor data resulting from a process manipulation
in a certain time step and its concealed version. In this example, the attacker
needs to modify 4 features.
looking for a modification ~x+ δ s.t. y(~x+ δ) =‘under attack’.
As in the Integrity Attack, we consider L0 < k attacks.
D. Example of an Integrity Attack
We now illustrate an example of concealment over one time
step of a water distribution system. Consider an attacker that
aims to empty a water tank by changing the control signal to
the pumps, i.e., by forcing them to be OFF even after the water
in the tank falls below the level triggering their activation.
An anomaly detection system could detect this anomalous
condition by comparing the resulting sensor data with the
readings realized during normal operations. In order to hide
the attack,
the adversary has to modify some sensor readings that will
bring the system state to be classified as ‘safe’.
Since the data reflect a physical process, the effect of a
control command over an actuator affects different system
components—so, not only the components that are the tar-
get of attacker’s manipulation will be affected. In our case,
manipulating only the sensor readings related to the target
water pumps and tank does not assure to remain stealthy. For
example, as illustrated in the simplified example of Figure 2,
even if the attacker’s process manipulation is only targeting
Tank 2, in order to remain stealthy, the attacker needs to
manipulate four sensor readings. Two of them (Tank 2, Pump
2) are explicitly related to the actuator manipulation, while
the other two are consequently modified to be consistent with
the learned physical model, even if the corresponding physical
process is not manipulated.
E. Proposed Framework for Attack Computation
For both the white box and black box case, the attacker
is assumed to intercept and manipulate sensor readings in
real time. The white box attacker is able to interactively
query a classification oracle to determine which features to
manipulate, and to which values to set those features. For the
black box attacker, the target features to manipulate and their
manipulated value are computed without oracle’s feedback.
For the white box attack, we propose to compute the
manipulations using an iterative algorithm (without using a
5more complex machine learning based approach). This algo-
rithm calculates solutions that are ‘safe’ from the detector
perspective. The algorithm is tunable, i.e., the attacker can
act on some algorithm parameters that impact over time the
computation and, consequently, the evasion efficacy. Moreover,
the algorithm is constrainable, i.e., the attacker can decide the
maximum number of features to be modified for each time
step. Again, this speeds up computation but can impact the
solution quality. Keeping the solution simple underlines the
fact that, if the attacker steals the model, he does not strictly
need a strong theoretical background to succeed. As we shall
see later, even such simple white box attacks will be quite
effective (although expensive).
For the black box attack, we propose the use of a Deep
neural network that is capable of outputting concealed sensor
readings. The attacker is adversarially training the neural
network to learn how the detector expects the ICS to behave.
This trained neural network then receives the traffic coming
from the PLC. When the attacker manipulates the commands
sent to the actuators, the neural network adjusts the anomalous
data to resemble ‘safe’ data. This manipulated version is sent
to the SCADA. This method can also be used for Availability
Attack: first, we learn how the system behaves when targeted
by an attack to the actuators; then, we use the network to
transform sensor readings to resemble ‘under attack’.
IV. REPLAY, BLACK BOX, AND WHITE BOX EVASION
We now present a detailed design for the three attacks
that we consider. We start with details on the autoencoder-
based attack detector (proposed in prior work [11]), then
introduce the replay attack (proposed in prior work [25]).
We provide details on the white box attack (which uses a
classification oracle to optimize the manipulations). We then
conclude with the black box approach, which leverages an
online concealment method without any prior knowledge about
the physical process that generates the sensor readings and the
detection scheme (except that it uses Deep Learning). Given
these premises, we note that, while adversarial examples found
using the white box approach depend on the internal structure
of the attacked anomaly detector, examples crafted through
the black box approach are independent from the addressed
detection scheme.
A. Deep Learning-based Attack Detector
In this work, we focus on the anomaly detection systems
proposed in [7], [10], [11], which are based on the same
underlying idea (see Section VII). The anomaly detector
consists of two parts, namely a Deep Learning model (with n
features as input and output) trained over the normal operation
sensors readings of an ICS, and a comparison analysis between
the input and output of the model. The idea is that the deep
model has learned to reproduce the system behaviour under
normal operating conditions with a low reconstruction error,
so it reproduces a higher reconstruction error when fed with
anomalous sensor readings (sensor readings are anomalous
either if sensor values are outside normal operation ranges or if
there are contextual anomalies among values). The comparison
between input and output of the deep model is used to decide
if the system is ‘safe’ or ‘under attack’.
In particular, we use the specific autoencoder proposed
in [11], which is available as open source [26]. The au-
toencoder (AE) receives as input ~x = [r1, r2, ..., rn] the
n-dimensional vector of sensor readings. AE outputs an n-
dimensional vector ~o = [v1, v2, ..., vn], where vi s.t. i ∈
{1, ..., n} represents the reconstructed value w.r.t. the input
reading ri . In order to decide if the system is under attack,
the mean squared reconstruction error between observed and
predicted features are computed. If the mean squared recon-
struction error exceeds a threshold θ, the system is classified
as under attack. The authors chose θ as 99.5 percentile (Q99.5)
of the average reconstruction error over the training set.
We formalize this as follows. Given an input ~x ∈ X ,
we define: ~e = ~x − ~o = [d1, . . . , dn] as the reconstruction
error n-dimensional vector, ε(~e) as the corresponding average
reconstruction error:
ε(~e) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
di
2, (1)
and y(~x) as the classified state of the water distribution system
out of AE Intrusion Detection System. Given an input ~x, y is
‘under attack’ if ε greater than θ:
y(~x) =
{
‘under attack’ if ε(~e) > θ
‘safe’ otherwise
(2)
Moreover, the authors propose a window parameter that takes
into consideration the mean of ε(~e) of the last window time
steps to decide if the current tuple is ‘safe’. This helps diminish
the amount of false positives, since an alarm is raised only if
in the last window time steps the mean of ε(~e) is above θ.
B. Replay Attack
In the replay attack setting (prior work, used here as base-
line), the attacker does not know how detection is performed.
In order to avoid detection, the attacker is able to replay sensor
readings that have been recorded while no anomalies were
occurring in the system. In particular, we assume that the
attacker was able to record selected data occurring exactly
n days before. I.e., if the evasion attack starts at 10 a.m., the
attacker starts replaying data from 10 a.m. one day before.
C. White Box Attack
In the white box setting, the attacker knows how detection
is performed, all thresholds and parameters of the detector,
as well as the normal operations ranges for each one of the
model features. For example, the attacker knows which sensor
readings are common during normal operation of the physical
process. As a result, the attacker essentially has access to an
oracle of the autoencoder, where the attacker can provide
arbitrary ~x features and gets the individual values of the
reconstruction error vector ~e.
The attacker then computes maxi ~e and finds the sensor
reading ri with the highest reconstruction error from ~x.
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Fig. 3. Detailed attacker framework for white box attack computation
In order to satisfy ε(~e′) < θ, the attacker attempts to
decrease the reconstruction error di error by changing ri.
Sensor readings ri are modified in the range of normal
operating values; this guides the computation to a solution that
is consistent with the physical process learned by the detector.
For example, if normal operations of sensor ri are in the range
[0, 5], the attacker tries to substitute the corresponding value
of ri according to its range to see if the related reconstruction
error decreases. This results in ~x′ = [r1, . . . , r′i, . . . , rn], where
d′i < di and, accordingly, ε(~e
′) < ε(~e). Figure 3 shows
the steps followed by the attacker in such context, while
Algorithm 1 is the pseudo-code applied to compute sensor
readings modifications.
In order to find the value of ri that decreases ε(~e) the most,
we can introduce X as the matrix containing the mutations of
~x w.r.t. ri.
X =

r1 . . . r
1
i ... rn
r1 . . . r
2
i ... rn
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
r1 . . . r
m
i ... rn

were rki ∈ normal operations values for senor i. Among the
all mutations, we select the one that generates the lower
reconstruction error ε(~e). After choosing the best value over
the variable ri the algorithm repeats until a solution with
average reconstruction error lower than θ is found.
Two stopping criteria are put in place: patience and budget.
It could happen that no lower reconstruction errors di are
found by changing the value of a chosen reading ri. In this
case, we try to change the other readings in descending order
of reconstruction error. patience mechanism is put in place to
avoid wasting of computation. If no improved solutions are
found in patience iterations, the input is no more optimized.
According to the communication mechanism between PLCs
and SCADA, the attacker may be constrained to send the
data in a certain amount of time. budget is the maximum
amount of times that loop at Line 8 (Algorithm 1) can be
performed. After budget attempts without finding a set of
modified readings that satisfies ε(~e′) < θ, the input is no more
optimized, and no solution is found.
Exiting the loop at Line 8 due to a stopping criterion is
not providing a misclassified example. Even though a solution
such that ε(~e′) < θ is not found, the resulting tuple is likely
to have a lower ε(~e), i.e., ε(~e) > ε(~e′) > θ.
D. Black box attack
In the black box setting, the attacker does not know anything
about the detection mechanism except the fact that it relies
Algorithm 1 White Box evasion attack
1: procedure CONCEAL(~x)
2: c← 0 . number of changes
3: i← 0 . last optimization
4: solved← False
5: ~e← compute reconstruction errors(~x)
6: previous best error ← ε(~e) . access oracle
7: ~e← sort descending(~e)
8: while !(solved) && (c − i) < patience && c <
budget do
9: f ← choose feature to optimize(~e)
10: X ← compute matrix of mutations(~x, f)
11: x′, ~e′ ← find best mutation( ~X)
12: if ε(~e′) < previous best error then
13: previous best error ← ε(~e′)
14: new best← ~x′
15: else
16: i← c
17: end if
18: if ε(~e′) < θ then
19: solved← True
20: end if
21: c← c+ 1
22: ~e← sort descending(~e′)
23: end while
24: return new best
25: end procedure
on a Deep Learning Model: the attacker can only intercept
and manipulate the communication between the PLCs and
the SCADA. However, the nature of the ICS environment
allows us to assume that a detection mechanism trained over
a specific CPS should represent its physical rules in order to
spot anomalies.
In this case, a reasonable attack scheme could be divided
into five steps (Figure 5). The attacker first intercepts traffic
from PLCs to SCADA in order to collect information on how
the ICS behaves under normal conditions. Second, collected
data are used to learn how the system behaves normally and
train a Deep Learning model. Third, the attacker manipulates
the physical process; anomalous data are generated as a
consequence. Fourth, the adversarial trained model is used to
conceal anomalous readings, by morphing them into concealed
data that will be classified as ‘safe’; the concealed data is
forwarded to the SCADA.
Autoencoder-based Generator. We implement the black box
attack using an autoencoder network to generate concealed
data (the word generator is used with a different meaning than
the usual one. In our case the input is not random noise that
is going to be crafted by the network). The autoencoder is
trained while intercepting normal traffic; the network learns
to output tuples that are classified as being normal with
high confidence. Forwarding the output of the adversarial
network—regardless of how detector is built—forces it to
misprediction, because the adversarial examples have been
adjusted to resemble normal operations. Note that the autoen-
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Fig. 4. Architecture of our Adversarial trained autoencoder. Note that the
dimensionality of the representation that the autoencoder learns is greater
than the input data dimensionality (i.e., m > n); the exact number of hidden
units is set according to the input dimensionality.
coder does not completely change the tuple; intuitively, only
the part that contains the anomaly is reconstructed to match
the learned physical behavior.
We explored different architectures, activation and loss func-
tions for the autoencoder network. Experimentally, we verified
that by using hidden layers to increase the data dimensionality
(i.e., with more units than the input and output layers),
rather than decreasing it, we achieved a higher concealment
capacity than canonical ‘compressing’ models. Particularly, we
implemented an autoencoder network with three hidden layers,
as depicted in Figure 4. We used mean squared error as a loss
function and sigmoid as an activation function; to train the
network, we use the ADAM optimizer with learning rate set
to 0.001.
Post-processing. In order to generate feasible inputs for the
anomaly detector, we need to consider that not all the sensor
readings assume continuous values—some are categorical in-
tegers that represent the status of actuators. Since the output
of a neural network is continuous, we need to post process all
the readings that are supposed to be integers. For example, if a
pump status assumes value 0 when is it turned off and 1 when
it is turned on, post processing approximates the corresponding
output value to the nearest allowed integer. According to this
post processing, some other values should be adjusted in order
to match the physical rules. This is the case, for example, of
speed sensors that must read 0 if their related pump is off.
CNN-based Generator. To verify the transferability of the
attacks, we also trained a generator based on a convolutional
neural network (CNN), and then forwarded the crafted exam-
ples to the autoencoder-based detector. In this case, the CNN
was performing 1D convolutions over the current time step t
(i.e., the time step to be concealed) and t− 1.
E. Availability Attack
A number of approaches are feasible to reach our alternative
goal of Availability Attack. For example, it is easy to cause a
X
Fig. 5. Detailed attacker’s framework for black box attack computation.
false alarm by replacing sensor readings with random values.
We argue that such an attack would be noisy and likely
attributed to bad sensor readings by the operator, and not be
blamed on the detection system. Instead, the attacker should
raise the alarm while concealing readings in a physically
plausible way.
In order to achieve this result, we propose to use the black
box approach. In this case, the attacker needs first to generate
some ‘under attack’ traffic (e.g., by simulation or her own
testbed). Given that traffic, the attacker can train a network
to predict ‘under attack’ tuples. Then, the attacker uses the
trained network to manipulate the normal traffic to resemble
‘under attack’ traffic.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the two proposed
attack mechanisms. We assume different attacker settings to
study the behavior of our contribution.
First, we introduce the datasets we used for our experiments:
the BATADAL dataset and data coming from a real industrial
process (WADI dataset). Then, we show and analyze the
results of the evasion attacks carried out over ICS datasets.
We discuss Integrity Attacks (in which the attacker tries to
misclassify the ‘under attack’ samples) by investigating the
impact along X dimension and comparing them to replay
attacks. Moreover we evaluate the behavior of black box
Integrity Attack along D dimension. We then evaluate the
usage of our black box approach to generate Availability
Attack (leading to misclassification of the ‘safe’ samples).
Finally we conduct the evaluation of our contribution in real-
time over TestbedX testbed.
A. Dataset 1: BATADAL
The first dataset was generated with epanetCPA [27], an
open-source object-oriented Matlab toolbox for modelling the
hydraulic response of water distribution systems to cyber-
physical attacks. The dataset was originally generated for the
BATADAL [14] competition, which ran between 2016 and
2017. The goal of BATADAL was to objectively compare the
performance of algorithms for the detection of cyber attacks in
8water distribution systems. The system considered for the com-
petition is C-Town, a medium-size water distribution network
(i.e., about 400 nodes and 420 arcs) first presented in [28].
The BATADAL competition was based on three datasets: the
first contains data coming from the simulation of 365 days of
normal operations, while the second and the third contains
14 attacks (7 attacks each). The details of the attacks can
be found in [14]. Each dataset contains readings from 43 C-
Town sensors read every 60 minutes. These variables contain:
tank water levels (7 variables), inlet and outlet pressure for
one actuated valve and all pumping stations (12 variables),
as well as their flow and status (24 variables). All variables
are continuous, with the exception of the status of valve and
pumps, represented by binary variables.
The original attack dataset (from http://www.batadal.net/
data.html) contained sensor data readings that were manually
concealed . For that reason, we could not use the original
attack dataset directly (as we wanted to add concealment
ourselves). Instead, we re-created the attacks (and resulting
sensor data) from the BATADAL dataset for this work using
the original setup, without any manual concealment. In our
new version, the data are collected from sensors every 15
minutes instead of hourly as in the original setting.
B. Dataset 2: WADI
Our second dataset is based on the Water Distribution
(WADI) testbed, a real-world ICS testbed located at Singapore
University of Technology and Design [29]. It is composed
by two elevated reservoir tanks, six consumer tanks, two
raw water tanks and a returned tank. It contains chemical
dosing systems, booster pumps and valves, instrumentation
and analyzers. WADI is controlled by 3 PLCs that operate over
103 network sensors. Moreover, the testbed is equipped with
a SCADA system. WADI consists of three main processes:
P1 (Primary supply and analysis), P2 (Elevated reservoir with
Domestic grid and leak detection), and P3 (Return process).
For anomaly detection purposes, we consider sensor data from
P1 and P2, since the return process is only implemented for
water recycle purposes. Considering stages P1 and P2, we have
data coming every second from 82 sensors. In this work, we
use two WADI datasets. The first dataset contains data of 14
days of normal operations, the second contains 15 attacks to
physical processes spanned over two days of operations. This
dataset is available on request from its authors [30].
We primarily use the WADI dataset for two reasons: i) to
show that the discussed detection mechanism is applicable to
real world ICS data, and ii) to see whether our attack method-
ology is transferable from a scenario in which simulated data
are used to another scenario in which real data are used.
C. Evaluation Setup
We evaluate the detection accuracy over datasets under
original conditions (i.e., no Integrity Attacks), the White Box,
AE Black Box, and CNN Black Box Integrity Attacks. The
Accuracy is defined as:
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
, (3)
where TP stands for True Positive, TN for True Negative,
FP for False Positive and FN for False Negative. The
attacker’s concealment goal can be expressed in term of
Accuracy: the Integrity Attack is successful if the detector
accuracy over the concealed tuples goes to 0. The closer the
accuracy comes to 0, the higher the amount of misclassified
tuples.
Both white and black box attacks are implemented using
Python 3.6.5, neural networks are implemented and trained
using Keras 2.2.4 with TensorFlow 1.11.0 backend. Experi-
ments were performed on a laptop equipped with Intel i7-
7500U CPU, 16GB of RAM, and NVIDIA GeForce 940MX
GPU 4GB.
Training of Attack Detector. For both BATADAL and
WADI, we trained the attack detector [11] on sensor readings
occurring during normal operational data (first dataset). Then
we tuned window parameter using the attack datasets. These
datasets contains both instances of normal operations and
attacks to the physical process. Each attack recorded in both
datasets is preceded and followed by instances of normal op-
erations. The effect of a manipulation over a water distribution
system can take a while before being detected and it can last
over time even if the manipulation is not occurring anymore
(i.e., if a pump is turned on to increase level in a water tank,
it takes a while to bring the water to an anomalous value
and when the pump is turned off the level in the tank takes a
while before returning to normal operating conditions). Tuples
of sensor readings have a related ground truth that report
if any manipulation was occurring in the physical process.
As the attack datasets are highly unbalanced, there are more
instances of normal operations (negative class) than instances
of manipulations of the physical process. The ground truth
reports whether manipulation was occurring, but the effect in
the data may not be seen immediately.
In order to select window parameter we considered the
precision and recall of the detector, taking care also of the
False Positive Rate (FPR). We are interested especially in
raising a little amount of false positives (ideally no False
Positives) while being able to classify correctly the attacks.
For the BATADAL dataset (where sensor readings are sam-
pled every 15 minutes), we found that parameter window = 3
quarter of hours is a reasonable decision boundary to flag
correctly attacks and do not raise False alarms. This gives a
Accuracy = 0.93, Precision = 0.90, Recall = 0.58, FPR = 0.01.
Changing window parameter we are able to increase the
Recall at the price of decreasing Precision that means raising
a higher number of False Alarms. With the considered window
value we obtain a detector that gives a small number of false
alarms, so even if not, an attack is detected for the whole
duration of the physical manipulation, when an alarm is raised
we are pretty confident that an anomaly is occurring.
For the WADI dataset, we found that parameter window = 60
seconds is a reasonable decision boundary to flag correctly
attacks and distinguish them from False Positives. This gives a
Accuracy = 0.97, Precision = 0.77, Recall = 0.57, FPR = 0.01.
As in the BATADAL dataset, we preferred a window size that
results in an higher Precision and consequently highly reliable
alarms. Note that when we discuss accuracy in Section V-D,
9we focus our attention to accuracy over the instances of data
recorded during the manipulation over the physical process
(ground truth ‘under attack’).
Replay attack. In this attack, the attacker replays for the whole
duration of the physical manipulation the sensor readings as
recorded at the same hour s days ahead (assuming that process
operations are often periodic within 24h). s is chosen to let
the replay contain only normal operations data. For example
given a physical manipulation that last 50 hours, we replay
sensor readings as happened 72 hours earlier (3 days earlier).
White box attack. In this attack, the attacker manipulates
variables required to find a solution (according to the two
stopping criteria introduced in Section IV-C and constraints
over modifiable sensor readings). The result of this experiment
highly depends on the detection mechanism. The attacker is
using the oracle to determine if the concealment is successful.
The detection scheme (as explained in Section IV-A) computes
the mean of the reconstruction error over all the sensors, this
results in the manipulation of only the sensor readings that
contain anomalies (which are a small subset of sensors).
Black box attack. For the black box attack we conducted
two different experiments. In the first, the attacker uses an
autoencoder (AE) as generator and sends predicted readings
to the SCADA. For the BATADAL dataset (43 variables),
we train an autoencoder with 64 and 128 units for the first
and second hidden layer respectively; for the WADI dataset
(82 variables), we use 128 and 256 units. For the second
experiment, the generator is a convolutional neural network
(CNN) instead of the AE to show independence between the
Deep Learning generator and the Deep Learning detector.
D. Unconstrained Integrity Attack
In this experiments we assume that the attacker is able to
control all the reported sensor readings. We discuss the results
of our evaluation of the detector for both datasets in several
scenarios (see Table I). We evaluated the performance of our
Integrity Attacks over the time steps with ground truth ‘under
attack’ labels only, i.e. we exclude normal operation data time
steps from computation of accuracy for this attack evaluation.
First row of Table I reports the average results obtained
with the three different attack strategies. For white box attacks
we tuned the parameters as follows, patience = 15 and the
budget = 200. Comparing the results we can notice that in
this setting the replay attack is giving 0 accuracy over the
replayed sensor readings, this means that when the attacker
can manipulate all the sensor readings, the anomaly detector
is no more able to spot the attack occurring over the physical
process. Considering the White and Black box AE approaches
we notice that the accuracy is 0.14, this represent a significant
drop in detector performance, but not as effective as the replay
of all sensor readings. The CNN underperforms the AE. This
is expected since the convolutional operation is not able to
exploit the spatial correlations between all time series. While
the fully-connected architecture of the AE allows it to learn
relationships among all inputs, the CNN can only build upon
the correlations between adjacent time series, i.e., depending
on the order of the features in the input layer.
Second row of Table I refers to Integrity Attacks over WADI
Dataset. In this case, for the white box parameters we choose
patience = 40 and the budget = 300. Result over this dataset
shows that Replay attack can hide the anomaly occurring
over the CPS. The performance of the white box approach
equals the one of the Replay Attack. Finally, black box is
underperforming the other methods. Despite this, detector’s
accuracy reduces more than 50% black box using autoencoder.
Computational Time. Table II reports the average required
time to compute the adversarial examples. Differently from
white box and black box, replay attack does not require
computation. White box approach requires an amount of
time that depends from the algorithm budget and patience
parameters. Black box approach requires a constant amount
of time since it consists of a neural network prediction. Given
our real-time constraints over the computation of adversarial
examples, we can conclude that both white box and black
box approach meets the requirements. In the BATADAL case
(where the sampling time is 15 minutes), we do not require
more than 2.28 seconds on average to compute an adversarial
example. In WADI case (where sampling time is 1 second), on
average we do not require more than 0.6 seconds to compute
an adversarial example.
Comments about Unconstrained Attacks. When the attacker
is free to manipulate all the sensor readings, results show that
replay attacks are the best way to hide anomalies occurring
over the physical process. First a replay attack does not
require computation to find the manipulated set of sensor
readings, second, the attacker does not need to be aware of
the detection mechanism and third, the considered anomaly
detector accuracy goes to zero since the replayed sensor read-
ings do not contain (additional) anomalies. White box, even
though achieves valuable results, requires computation and
the attacker needs to be omniscient wrt. defense mechanism.
Finally, we note that the black box attack is able to partially
hide anomalies without having access to any oracle of the
detector, with low computational effort (after training) and
same knowledge wrt. the attacked model as the replay attack.
E. Constrained Integrity Attack (X dimension)
In the previous subsection, we found that full replay attacks
can be a powerful and low cost way to evade (passive) anomaly
detectors, if all features can be replayed. In this section, we
demonstrate the impact on limitations on the attacker, e.g. if
the attacker can only control a subset of the reported sensor
values. For example, this can be the case if one PLC was
compromised by the attacker.
Definition of Constraints. In order to study the impact of this
kind of constraints, we selected k features for every attack that
can be modified. Then we studied how replay, white box, and
black box attacks perform when these constraint are applied.
We defined the constrains as follows: starting from the results
of white box and black box attacks we determined the k
features that were changed most frequently (over the course of
each attack). The intuition behind this is as follows: features
that are modified most often in the unconstrained case are
assumed to have the highest impact on the performance of
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TABLE I
DETECTOR ACCURACY (BATADAL AND WADI DATASETS, EVASION ATTACK). THE COLUMN ‘ORIGINAL’ REFERS TO THE DETECTION ACCURACY OVER
THE CONSIDERED ATTACK WITHOUT CONCEALMENT; THE OTHER COLUMNS SHOW HOW THE ACCURACY CHANGES WITH THE PROPOSED ADVERSARIAL
INTEGRITY ATTACKS.
Detection Accuracy
Dataset Original Replay White Box AE Black Box CNN Black Box
BATADAL 0.60 0 0.14 0.14 0.27
WADI 0.68 0.07 0.07 0.31 0.46
TABLE II
AVERAGE TIME REQUIRED TO MANIPULATE A VECTOR OF SENSOR READINGS
Required computational time, mean(µx¯) and std(σx¯)
Replay White Box AE Black box CNN Black box
Dataset µx¯(s) σx¯ µx¯(s) σx¯ µx¯(s) σx¯
BATADAL - 2.28 2.46 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.003
WADI - 0.60 0.41 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002
the attack. We are assuming a worst case scenario in which
the attacker is limited to modify k features, but was able to
choose those k features to maximise her efficiency. Then, we
created 11 sets of k features that can be modified by the
attacker (with different counts k of features to be manipulated,
with the maximal number determined by the Dataset used).
In the case of white box and black box attack, we limited
the adversarial example exploration to the k features extracted
for the considered approach. In the case of replay attack we
applied the same replay strategy introduced before but we
replayed only the selected k features extracted from the white
box approach. We note that this choice (replay the features
extracted from the white box approach) was made to reflect
worst case scenario, i.e., an attacker that is able to replay
exactly the k features that a white box attacker would replay.
Impact of Constraints. Table III reports the average result of
the constrained attacks over BATADAL and WADI Datasets.
In the case of BATADAL Dataset, we note that the replay
attack does not cope well with constraints. Since the anomaly
detector is able to spot the presence of contextual anomalies,
the replay of only k features results in alarms, resulting in
an average detection accuracy higher than in the benign case
(i.e., no manipulation of sensors applied). In the case of white
box and black box attacks we can notice that the detection
accuracy is always lower than the original accuracy. In the
white box case accuracy decreases with the number of features
that can be modified. Black box accuracy is not monotonically
decreasing with the number of features that can be modified,
the minimum is found when the attacker can compromise
8 features. Certain set constraints match better the physical
rules learned by the detector and allow the creation of more
effective adversarial examples. In case of WADI, we can
observe that the replay attack is able to diminish detector’s
accuracy especially when the attacker manipulates 3 features.
White box and attack is able to achieve the same accuracy
as if in the Unconstrained Attack case when manipulating 15
features. In the case of black box attack, results show that for
20 manipulated features, the attack performing slightly better
than in the unconstrained case.
Moreover, we investigated how the set of features that can
be modified by the attacker changes the efficacy of black box
attack. We constrained black box attack to search solutions
in the set of features extracted from the white box attack.
Result shows that black box attack benefits of this choice, i.e.
detector’s accuracy drops to 0.21 when acting on 3 features
in WADI case (details are provided in Appendix Table VII).
This indicates that depending on which features are availble to
modify by the attacker, attacks might be even more efficient
than our main results shown previously.
Comments about Constrained Attacks. This experiment
showed that a replay attack performs worse in the case in
which only on a limited set of sensors can be manipulated.
In particular, the detector’s accuracy is increased due to con-
textual anomalies that are inserted in the data. Our proposed
White and black box approaches reduce detector’s accuracy in
real-time without introducing contextual anomalies.
F. Black Box: impact of D dimension
Another aspect that we investigated is the impact of Dˆ
on the applicability of black box attack. Especially, we are
interested in understanding how much normal operational data
the attacker needs to conduct the proposed black box attack.
We investigated the impact of less available normal data (i.e., a
fraction of Dˆ) on the achieved reduction in detection accuracy
for the black box attacker. We performed a sensitivity analysis
by random sampling normal operations data 10 times the for
each one of the considered percentages of data. Then, we
trained an adversarial network for each sampling of the data
percentage (50 adversarial networks trained for each dataset).
As result we computed the sample mean (µx¯) and sample
standard deviation (σx¯) of the resulted detection accuracy by
using the different black box networks.
For BATADAL, the resulting mean detection accuracy
ranges from 0.14 for 100% of Dˆ available for AE training
to 0.44 for 5% of Dˆ available (compared to 0.59 without
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TABLE III
IMPACT OF THE NUMBER OF FEATURES CONTROLLABLE BY THE ATTACKER. BY DECREASING THE NUMBER OF FEATURES THAT THE ATTACKER CAN
CONTROL, WE CAN NOTICE THAT REPLAY ATTACK IS NO MORE ABLE TO HIDE ANOMALIES. REPLAY ATTACK INTRODUCES CONTEXTUAL ANOMALIES
WHILE BOTH BLACK AND WHITE BOX APPROACHES ARE AVOID THIS PROBLEM.
Original Accuracy vs. # of Controlled sensors k (43 features BATADAL/ 82 features WADI)
Dataset Accuracy Experiment 43/82 20 15 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
BATADAL 0.60
replay 0.00 0.93 0.90 0.78 0.69 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.71 0.68 0.78 0.73
white box 0.14 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.35 0.51 0.52
black box 0.14 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.24 0.27 0.32 0.34 0.49 0.56 0.55
WADI 0.68
replay 0.07 0.87 0.85 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.44 0.40 0.49
white box 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.25
black box 0.31 0.28 0.48 0.58 0.54 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.68 0.68
TABLE IV
WADI DATASET: IMPACT OF FRACTION OF Dˆ ON CONCEALING CAPACITY.
Accuracy for Black Box % of Dˆ
Original 100% 75% 50% 25% 10% 5%
Attack Accuracy µx¯ σx¯ µx¯ σx¯ µx¯ σx¯ µx¯ σx¯ µx¯ σx¯
BATADAL 0.60 0.14 0.16 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.41 0.25 0.51 0.26
WADI 0.68 0.31 0.35 0.08 0.31 0.01 0.29 0.04 0.28 0.09 0.30 0.13
concealment). For WADI, the resulting mean detection ac-
curacy ranges from 0.31 for 100% of Dˆ available for AE
training to 0.50 for 5% of Dˆ available (compared to 0.68
without concealment). In the case of WADI we can Results
over BATADAL dataset show, performance of the attacker’s
adversarial network is performing almost the same if trained
with 100% to 25% of data. Lower than 25% of the data
we notice substantial performance degradation. Looking at
standard deviation, we notice that less data (10%. 5%) causes
high model variance. To perform the black box attack the
attacker needs 25% of data to guarantee evasion success.
In the case of WADI dataset performance of the adversarial
network remains almost constant across the splits. WADI
water distribution network is small and the three stage are
repetitive. Information contained in 5% of the data (16 hours
of recordings) could be enough to model the system behavior.
At the same time, we notice that standard deviation increases
in correspondence of 5%, this means that the performance is
changing according to the data that are picked in the random
split (e.g., some processes occurring through the system are
not present in the split). Having access to more data reduces
the variance of the models, 25% of the data assures low
accuracy with a small standard deviation.
G. Availability Attack
In Availability Attack, the attacker aims to bring the
Accuracy value to 0 over ‘safe’ samples in order to achieve
misclassification of ‘safe’ tuples. In our results for both
datasets (normal operations without any attacks), we are
able to completely change the prediction outcome over every
instance of the normal operations (i.e., from Accuracy 1.0 to
0.0) while training the adversarial network on data of attacks to
the actuators. This attack can be carried out by an attacker also
choosing a specific type of anomaly that he wants to highlight.
In that case, the attacker can train the network only on the
desired class of adversarial manipulations sensors readings.
In Figure 6, we demonstrate how the Availability Attack is
performing over 50 time steps of BATADAL dataset. It can
be seen that ε(~e) (after the concealment) is not very far from
threshold θ, but the alarm is raised. Checking the physical state
of the system directly will result in finding that no physical
anomalies seem to be occurring in the system (as it is). The
conjunction of these two factors will lead the defender to
believe θ is lower than required, and the detection system is
thus unreliable.
H. Real time Evasion Attacks
In order to test the real-time feasibility of our attacks, we
deployed the anomaly detector [11] in TestbedX (a real world
ICS testbed), and then attacked it in real-time. We collected
15 hours of normal operations occurring over the ICS. We are
able to gather 62 sensor readings sampled every 10 seconds.
In this case we tuned the window parameter to 30, that
means that the detector is considering the sensor readings
occurring in the last 5 minutes. First, we tested the reliability
of the system; we left the system running 7 hours without
anomalies occurring. We obtained 2 false positives instances
occurring for 10 minutes each. We then performed some
actuators manipulation over the system. In Table V we report
the summary of the tested anomalies. We replicated some of
the anomalies reported in WADI dataset that refer with the
same identifiers.
While anomalies were occurring, we also launched our
integrity attacks in TestbedX to asses their feasibility and
efficacy. We tested both the white box and black box approach
in real time by simulating the sensors value manipulation done
by the attacker, all the instances of the anomalies occurring
in the system were successfully misclassified. In Table V the
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Fig. 6. Availability Attack results over BATADAL dataset. The graph
shows the comparison in therms of reconstruction error, before and after an
Availability attack. A set of sensor readings that was classified as ‘safe’ is
then classified as ‘under attack’ because surpass the threshold.
last two columns summarize the results of white box and black
box attacks carried out in real time.
VI. DISCUSSION
In the evaluation section, we showed that replay attacks
(while not requiring machine learning algorithms) is only
efficent only when all sensor readings replayed. Thus, replay
attacks do not represent a viable solution for hiding anomalies
when the attacker can act on a limited set of sensor readings.
In particular, Replay Attacks introduce contextual anomalies
since sensor readings will not be consistent any longer. Even
though the physical process is repetitive, replay of set of a
subset of sensor values as observed n days earlier cannot be
expected to avoid detection. In contrast, our proposed white
box and black box integrity attacks overcome this problem by
generating examples that are consistent with non-manipulated
sensor values. Having access to the detector in white box
allows to act only on a very small subset of sensor readings to
reach misclassification goal. Black box approach requires the
alteration of a larger subset of sensor readings to succeed. That
said, the attack scenarios considered in this work require the
manipulation of less than half of the total number of variables
monitored by SCADA. This fact justifies why an attacker could
resort to a sophisticated approach for concealment rather than
a replay attacks over all sensor values.
We now discuss the quality of results coming from the
proposed approaches. Figure 7, represents the comparison
between trend of ε(~e) wrt. the threshold θ during the whole
actuators’ manipulation done in one attack from WADI dataset.
Comparing the white and black box AE ε(~e) results, we notice
that the solution provided by the white box algorithm is closer
to θ than the black box solution. This is because the white box
algorithm is looking at θ value to decide whether to stop the
computation. Black box is not performing any optimization
wrt. the attacked detector, so it is providing a solution that is
matching the learned physical behavior, and what the detector
expects from a non-anomalous sample. After second 200, the
magenta line shows that the ε(~e) is around 0, meaning that we
are sending inputs that are in line with the detector expected
behavior. A comparison of AE and CNN black box solutions
shows that the detector’s reconstruction error based on the
concealment by the CNN is closer to θ. This means that the
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Fig. 7. Comparison of concealment results. While the accuracy after con-
cealment in both white and black box goes to 0, we can see how the two
approaches are behaving differently. We plot the average reconstruction error
over time (ε(~e)) and the threshold θ.
learned physical behavior by the CNN is not error free, but
sufficient to classify the data as ‘safe’.
VII. RELATED WORK
We now discuss important related work in the area of
anomaly detection in CPS, and evasion attacks on classifiers.
Anomaly Detection in CPS. Detecting stealthy attacks in CPS
through the identification of process-based anomalies, without
requiring a detailed physical model, is an active research topic.
Hadzˇiosmanovic´ et al. [31] use an autoregressive model on
time series extracted from modbus PLC traffic, evaluating
their approach on data from two water treatment plants;
Krotofil et al. [32] use an information theoretical approach
to detect sensor spoofing attacks; Aoudi et al. [8] use model-
free techniques rooted on singular spectrum analysis to detect
structural changes in the process behavior.
More recently, various proposals in this space use deep
learning techniques, usually by training a learning-based
model on data gathered during the normal operation of the
process, and statistically comparing the sensor readings with
the model’s prediction at runtime. Wickramasinghe et al. [33]
provide an overview on how Deep Learning techniques can
be used in the context of CPS security. Goh et al. [7] propose
an architecture to detect anomalies over a water treatment
testbed with a Recurrent neural network (LSTM-RNN) used
to predict sensor readings, and CUSUM to compute the
difference between the predicted outputs and the actual sensor
readings; building on this approach, and using the same dataset
for evaluation, Kravchik et al. [10] suggest the use of a
convolutional neural network to perform one-step prediction,
while Taormina et al. [11] propose the autoencoder-based
detector that we use as a target to evaluate our attacks.
Adversarial Learning for Classifier Evasion. The effective-
ness of Adversarial Machine Learning to evade ML-based
classifiers has been demonstrated in a wide range of appli-
cations, ranging from face recognition [37] to voice recogni-
tion [40] and malware detection [22]. Table VI classifies recent
techniques in this domain according to the adversary’s knowl-
edge on the classifier’s algorithm and training dataset. In the
white box scenario (i.e., the adversary knows the internals of
the trained model and the training set completely), Rndic and
Laskov [34] present a case study on the evasion of PDFRate,
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TABLE V
REAL-TIME DETECTION OF PHYSICAL PROCESS MANIPULATIONS OVER TESTBEDX. WE REPLICATED ANOMALIES CONTAINED ON WADI DATASET
Attack Starting Ending Duration Detected First instance Detected concealment
Identifier Time Time (minutes) detected White box Black box
WADI 1 14:09 14:31 22 3 14:24 7 7
WADI 7 15:07 15:11 4 3 15:08 7 7
WADI 8 15:30 15:40 10 7 7 7
WADI 9 10:57 10:58 1 3 10.58 7 7
WADI 14 11:59 12:01 2 3 12:00 7 7
TABLE VI
RECENT ADVERSARIAL LEARNING TECHNIQUES FOR EVASION,
ACCORDING TO THE ATTACKER’S KNOWLEDGE AND THE DOMAIN OF
APPLICATION. THE SETTING FOR OUR ATTACKS IS MARKED WITH ?.
White Box Grey Box Black Box
(D,X , f, w) (Dˆ,X , f, wˆ) (Dˆ, Xˆ , fˆ , wˆ)
query samples
oracle only
Malware [34] [20] [22], [24]
Image [35]–[37] [38] [39]
ICS ? ?
a malicious PDF detector based on random forests, using a
white box gradient-based evasion method [41], comparing it
to a black box mimickry attack, and discussing the attack
effectiveness according to different attacker models. After the
seminal paper that demonstrated the existence of adversarial
examples for neural networks [19], work has shifted to Deep
Learning. Goodfellow et al. [36] study the cause of adversar-
ial examples and devise a fast gradient method to perform
adversarial perturbations, demonstrating their results in the
image classification context under a perfect-knowledge white
box scenario. More recently, Carlini and Wagner [35] defeat
a defensive technique known as defensive distillation [42].
White box techniques have also been applied to defeat face
recognition, also through physical perturbations (e.g., wearing
specially crafted accessories) [37].
In more restrictive scenarios, the adversary is only aware
of the general structure of the model and how features are
extracted. Papernot et al. [38] use this imperfect knowledge to
build a surrogate model and demonstrate the effectiveness in
source-target misclassification (image recognition). Grosse et
al. [20] generalize the adversarial example crafting algorithm
presented in [38] to malware detection systems. In other
cases, the adversary attacks a classifier while querying the
system under attack as an oracle. This is the case of attacks
against proprietary online learning systems: to evade an online
malware classifier, Xu et al. [22] leverage the fact that the
target systems outputs the classification score to build a genetic
algorithm that morph the adversarial examples into being un-
detected. More recently, Dang et al. [24] lifted the assumption
of knowing the classification score, attacking oracle-like black-
box classifiers that only output a binary label; Papernot et
al. [39] work similarly in the context of multi-class classifiers
for image classification.
With respect to the state of the art, in our black box
attack the adversary does not rely on querying the classifier
as an oracle, neither on building a surrogate learner; instead,
we exploit the characteristics of the CPS domain to lift this
requirement.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
So far, deliberate manipulation of ICS attack detectors has
not been discussed in literature. In this work, we investigated
two kinds of real-time evasion attacks on Deep Learning-
based anomaly detectors in the context of Industrial Control
Systems. The goal of the attacks is to conceal an ongoing
manipulation of the process by manipulating the sensor values
reported to the detector. We argue that in contrast to evasion
attacks in other settings, such attacks on ICS require both
manipulations that comply to inherent physical constraints
between the features (that were learned by the detector), and
need to be performed in real-time (as the dynamic state of
the system cannot easily be predicted by the attacker). In
particular, we also show that replay attacks (while being fast)
are only effective if the attacker can manipulate all features,
otherwise the replaying of recorded data will lead to violations
of physical constraints that are detected. To mitigate those
issues for the attacker, we proposed white box and black box
attacks. Our white box attacker uses an optimization approach
with a detection oracle, while the black box attacker uses an
autoencoder (or CNN) to translate anomalous data to normal
data in real time. The evaluation of our implementation of both
approaches using data from two water distribution systems
demonstrates that attacks are feasible in general, and perform
better than replay attacks in cases where not all features can
be manipulated. In particular, we show that for the BATADAL
dataset our novel black box attack using autoencoder was able
to reduce detection accuracy as efficiently as the white box
attack (accuracy dropped from 0.60 to 0.14 in both cases).
Our results demonstrate that the required autoencoder can be
trained without knowledge of the detector (only using normal
operational data) and is computationally cheap (after training).
In addition to constraining the number of features to be
manipulated, we also investigated constraints on the attacker
knowledge of normal system operations (in the black box).
In general, the attacker required a dataset that was roughly a
quarter of the training dataset size to launch effective attacks.
We implemented our attacks in a real testbed, and showed
that malicious data could be generated on-the-fly, i.e., in
between each sampling step (every 10s, actual example gener-
ation took around 0.6s). That demonstrates that the proposed
attacks are allowing attackers to perform evasion detection on
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dynamic systems in real-time. In prior work, manipulations
are usually performed offline against a dataset, or assume that
data to be manipulated can be precisely predicted.
In addition to the Integrity attacks, we considered Availabil-
ity Attacks. In those attacks, the goal is to trigger detection
events with minimal changes of the reported data, in order
to reduce confidence in the detector. We show that we were
always able to introduce false alarms with minimal manipu-
lations. As consequence of our finding, we believe that future
ML-based attack detectors for complex feature sources such
as Cyber-Physical Systems need to be designed not only for
accurate detection of unconcealed attacks, but only to be more
robust against Evasion attacks. We plan to release our code as
open source, complementing the publicly available datasets.
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APPENDIX
A. Effect of constraints over Black box approach
Table VII shows the effect of constraining black box over
a different set of sensor readings. Specifically, we constrained
black box approach to manipulate the features that we ex-
tracted from white box approach. Black box performance can
be improved by the set of sensor readings that are available
to the attacker. BATADAL dataset case performance of black
and white box approach are similar. In the WADI case the
performance of black box is almost the same across all the
different experiments, the best performance is found when it
is constrained to manipulate 3 sensor readings.
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TABLE VII
BLACK BOX PERFORMANCE WHEN CONSTRAINED TO WORK ON THE SET OF FEATURES EXTRACTED FROM WHITE BOX ATTACK.
Original Accuracy vs. # of Controlled sensors k (43 features BATADAL/ 82 features WADI)
Dataset Accuracy Experiment 43/82 20 15 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
BATADAL 0.60
replay 0.00 0.93 0.90 0.78 0.69 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.71 0.68 0.78 0.73
white box 0.14 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.35 0.51 0.52
black box 0.14 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.39 0.52 0.55
WADI 0.68
replay 0.07 0.87 0.85 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.44 0.40 0.49
white box 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.25
black box 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.21 0.30
